We revisit the bi-directional causality between public debt and the rate of GDP growth for 10 EMU countries alongside the US, UK and Japan, over sample periods spanning from 1970 up to 2014 whilst accounting for the nonlinear properties of both the individual time series, and their relation in both directions. Our results indicate that the causal relation between debt and growth, in either direction, is weak at best. For most of the countries in our sample, we find no robust evidence of a long-run causal effect using bi-variate Granger causality tests. Bidirectional causality is detected only for Austria, while for France, Luxembourg and Portugal, causality runs solely from debt to growth, but the estimated effects are very small. In Finland, Spain and Italy, Granger causality (from growth to debt in the former two and debt to growth in Italy) appears to be present in the short-run. Our findings cannot be taken as evidence that a high level of public indebtedness is not risky for the economy or as invalidating hypotheses postulating effects in either direction in the relation between debt and growth.
Introduction
At a time when many EU governments have implemented harsh austerity budgets in the face of the euro area sovereign debt crisis in spite of a slow recovery in the aftermath of the 2007/08 financial crisis and high, if not growing, unemployment, the significance of the relation between public debt and economic growth has assumed particular policy relevance. It is not surprising, therefore, that the debate on the debt-growth nexus has flourished recently.
The debate has mainly revolved around whether there exists a public indebtedness threshold beyond which countries carrying high levels of debt experience significant costs in terms of GDP growth. At its core, is the seminal work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) suggesting that countries experience a sharp GDP growth penalty if they allow their public debt (defined as all debt that a government owes) to rise above 90% of GDP. 1 The significance of this finding cannot be overstated given the historically high levels of public debt in most advanced economies. Since its publication, a spurt of studies focusing on whether there exists, in fact, a universally valid tipping point in the debt/GDP ratio above which growth prospects are dramatically compromised, has ensued, causing much controversy (see, among others, Herndon et al., 2013; Pescatori et al., 2014; Égert, 2015) .
Adjudication of the debate notwithstanding, even the absence of a specific common threshold beyond which public debt penalizes economic growth, of course, would not mean that countries do not invite trouble by running irresponsible budgets, or that debt levels and economic performance are not statistically correlated. Yet, by focusing on the corroboration or refutation of Reinhart and Rogoff's findings, much of the subsequent literature has missed the opportunity to redirect the debate towards the critical question of the direction by which the implicit causality runs, namely, does high public indebtedness cause slower GDP growth or does low GDP growth increase public debt?
Arguably, countries pursuing irresponsible budget policies end up compromising future growth. However, it is equally reasonable to expect that an economic downturn produces higher levels of public debt even under an unchanged policy regime (as a result of lower tax revenue and higher government expenditure in public benefits), and a regime switch to policies aimed at alleviating the impact of a recession is likely to lead, at least in the 1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) present this result as a stylized fact, stressing the relevance of this relation to a range of times and places. They examine 44 countries covering almost two centuries of data on central government debt, inflation and growth. They organize the country-years data units in four groups by public debt/GDP ratios: 0 to 30%, 30 to 60%, 60 to 90%, and greater than 90%. They then compare average real GDP growth rates across the debt/GDP groupings. The non-parametric method used unearths a nonlinear relation, with a debt threshold effect becoming significant at around 90% of GDP.
short term, to even higher debt.
Significantly, most of related literature follows the assumption that causality runs from public debt to GDP growth. The few studies considering the possibility of reverse causality can be counted on one hand (Ferreira, 2009; Di Sanzo and Bella, 2015; Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2015; and Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro, 2015) . This is striking given the existence of other work positing that a country's level of public indebtedness is likely to grow when the growth rate of GDP is low (see, e.g., Bell et al., 2015) .
With the sole exception of Di Sanzo and Bella (2015) , the few studies investigating bi-directional causality between debt and growth have done so by applying the standard, linear Granger causality approach, thereby ignoring the possibility of a nonlinear relation.
This approach is problematic not only because the conventional Granger causality test has low power to detect nonlinear causal relations, but also because many studies suggest the existence of a nonlinear relation between debt and growth, either in the form of an inverse Ushaped curve or threshold-type behavior.
Di Sanzo and Bella (2015) is the only study investigating the links between debt and growth using both linear parametric and nonlinear nonparametric Granger causality tests, finding mixed evidence. Despite their contribution in being the first to apply nonlinear causality tests to the debt-growth relation, several caveats must be noted about their study, which provide us with plenty of scope to advance on their work. Although Di Sanzo and Bella (2015) argue that overlooking nonlinearities may result in misleading conclusions about
Granger causality and that linear as well as nonlinear causality tests are only valid under the hypothesis that the observed data are stationary, they test for unit roots using solely basic, linear unit root tests. Moreover, though they test for the presence of nonlinear causality using also the Diks and Panchenko (2006) test that we too employ, they do not consider the existence of nonlinearities in the individual series nor do they employ any nonlinear unit root tests to accurately establish the stationarity of the variables. We use the Harvey et al. (2008) test to verify whether there may exist any nonlinearities in the evolution of the individual time series, and for the series found to exhibit nonlinearities, we perform the nonlinear unit root test proposed by Kruse (2011) . Furthermore, though Di Sanzo and Bella (2015) acknowledge that the short length of the time series they use might affect the power of the tests they perform, we verify the robustness of our results by means of SYS-GMM panel estimations based on sample sizes of up to 930 observations on an extended panel of 37 countries.
We contribute to this literature by revisiting the bi-directional causality between debt and growth for the original EMU-11 countries (with the exclusion of Germany, for which consistent data over the sample period is not available) 2 along with the US, UK and Japan, over sample periods spanning from 1970 up to 2014. The analysis accounts for the nonlinear properties of both public debt and GDP growth, and their causal relation in both directions. In addition to conventional linear Granger causality tests and the adoption of a relevant cointegration method to address endogeneity concerns, 3 we employ state-of-the-art nonlinear techniques on the individual countries' time series dimension so as to best approximate the true data generation process in each country considered and, unlike any previous study using time series estimation methods, we perform robustness causality tests within a panel SYS-GMM framework that can satisfactorily deal with potential problems stemming from serial correlation, small-sample bias, measurement error and endogeneity. We find no robust evidence of causality in most of the countries in our sample, linearly or nonlinearly.
A synthesis of the literature on the debt-growth nexus

The effect of debt on growth
Theoretically, both neoclassical and endogenous growth models (Modigliani, 1961; Diamond, 1965; Saint-Paul, 1992; Aizenman et al., 2007) suggest that high levels of public debt will always reduce the rate of economic growth. Additional channels in support of a negative effect of public debt on long-term growth, include: (i) the 'debt overhang' hypothesis (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 1989) ; (ii) the 'liquidity constraint' hypothesis (Moss and Chiang, 2003) ; (iii) the 'crowding out' effect (Hansen, 2004) ; and (iv) the 'uncertainty' channel (Codogno et al., 2003; Cochrane, 2011) . Another channel through which high debt can have a negative impact on economic growth is that of long-term interest rates (e.g., Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999; Tanzi and Chalk, 2000) . Finally, some effects associated with financial liberalization ranging from greater bank risk-taking to the accumulation of a large external debt, can make a country vulnerable to economic shocks which often have severe recessionary consequences (see Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003; Nyambuu and Bernard, 2015) .
2
The original 11 members are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Germany had to be excluded from our sample since German debt data were only available from 1991 in the IMF WEO and AMECO databases, and from 1992 in the OECD database. 3 We also test for Granger causality within a cointegration framework using the associated error correction model (Granger, 1988) .
Given the theoretical predictions highlighted above, it is somewhat surprising that Reinhart and Rogoff's conclusion of a debt threshold of 90% of GDP above which countries experience a substantial decline in their GDP growth rate, prompted such controversy. Herndon et al. (2013) provided a strong critique, pointing to coding errors and less than adequate methodological choices. In their replication, they found that over 1946-2009, countries with public debt/GDP ratios above 90% averaged 2.2% real annual GDP growth, not -0.1%, as indicated by Reinhart and Rogoff. Other critiques ensued (see, e.g., Irons and Bivens, 2010) . While admitting the data coding error, Reinhart and Rogoff showed in subsequent papers (see Reinhart et al., 2012) that the growth rate in regimes of high debt, while positive, was still much lower than in regimes of low debt. Using data comprising up to 17 OECD advanced economies, Panizza and Presbitero (2014) employ a new instrument for public debt (a variable capturing valuation effects brought about by the interaction between foreign currency debt and exchange rate volatility) and, after controlling for endogeneity, are unable to reject the null hypothesis that debt has no impact on growth. Pescatori et al. (2014) found no evidence of any particular debt threshold above which growth prospects are seriously compromised and showed that countries with high but declining debt appear to grow equally as fast as countries with lower debt.
While this literature generally concludes that there is no universally valid tipping point after which the ratio of debt to GDP will necessarily lead to slower economic growth, there are also several studies which support the essence of Reinhart and Rogoff's findings (e.g., Cecchetti et al., 2011; Baum et al., 2013; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012) .
Several other studies, albeit failing to find evidence for a universally valid debt threshold, do find evidence that there is a significant negative effect of public debt build-up on output growth (e.g., Chudik et al., 2017) . Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) also find some evidence for a negative relation between public debt and growth, but not for a common debt threshold.
Whilst the literature is rather consensual in the view that high public debt poses significant economic challenges and makes the economy less resilient to shocks, some channels postulating a positive debt-growth relationship have also been hypothesized. For example, although Abbas and Christiansen (2010) Earlier empirical analyses had focused on the existence of an inverse U-shaped curve in the debt-growth relation. Patillo et al. (2002) found that at low levels of total external debt, in developing countries, the impact on the rate of GDP growth is positive, but this relation becomes negative at high levels of debt. Schclarek (2004) 
Bi-directional causality
The theoretical literature also postulates that causality may run in the other direction, from growth to debt. It has been hypothesized that low growth causes higher levels of debt (Reinhart et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2015) because tax revenues go down and spending goes up in a recession, thus increasing debt levels to maintain the welfare state. Yet, relatively few empirical studies have investigated bi-directional causality, and their findings are mixed.
Using OECD data for 20 countries over 1988 -2001 , Ferreira (2009 
Unit root and linearity tests
With few exceptions, prior empirical studies ignore investigating the times series properties of the individual public debt and GDP growth series, a choice seemingly based on the unwarranted assumption that both variables are linear and level stationary. Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2015) and Di Sanzo and Bella (2015) do check the presence of unit roots but they do so using solely fairly basic linear unit root tests. The former uses the Following the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) between those countries whose currencies continuously participated in the ERM of the EMS from its inception and those which joined later or suspended their participation, we take the central countries to be Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and the peripheral countries to be Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. For countries where some uncertainty may remain as to the order of integration of the underlying series, we proceed to test for a long-run relationship between debt and growth as well as causality using the ARDL bounds testing approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1999; Pesaran et al., 2001 ), a methodology which allows for the analysis of cointegration when it is not known with certainty whether the regressors are I(1) or I(0).
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Although the Granger representation theorem states that if two time series are cointegrated then there must be Granger causality between them (at least in one direction), the reverse is not necessarily true. This means that any finding of Granger causality in the absence of cointegration should be taken to be either spurious, or to reflect -at best -a shortterm phenomenon that does not persist in the long-run. As Eberhardt notes (2016, p. 3) , in the context of the long-run growth-debt relation "the presence of a long-run equilibrium is a prerequisite for the existence of any long-run causal relationship in the data". Another advantage that makes the ARDL approach particularly suited to our analysis lies in the rich set of dynamics of the ARDL specification, which allows the ARDL-based estimator to satisfactorily address potential endogeneity problems (Pesaran and Shin, 1999) .
To investigate the direction of causality, we test for ARDL cointegration in both directions. The ARDL(p,q) models estimated for each country are:  is given by 
where proposed by Banerjee et al. (1998) , which tests the null of no cointegration 0
Nonlinear causality test
Finally, we perform the Diks and Panchenko (2006) nonlinear causality test.
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Its application on the delinearized series ensures that any causality identified is solely nonlinear in nature. We apply the test by utilizing properly specified VAR models or, in the case of confirmed robust cointegration in both directions, the residuals of the ARDL models, thus accounting for the actual integration properties of the individual series and also the cointegration findings, a process that ensures the stationarity of the residuals.
Empirical analysis and results
We begin our analysis by inspecting the plots of the individual series for each country in our sample, and the respective scatter diagrams of the relationship between growth rates (Y) and debt-to-GDP ratios (D). There are two critical bounds: upper and lower. If the values of the F PSS and t BDM statistics exceed the upper bound, the null hypothesis is rejected. If they lie below the lower critical bound, the null cannot be rejected, and if they lie between the critical bounds, the test is inconclusive. 10 Diks and Panchenko (2006) introduced a new and more powerful nonparametric test for Granger non causality which avoids the severe over-rejection of the null hypothesis frequently observed in the use of the Hiemstra and Jones' (1994) test. They showed that the reason for over-rejection in the Hiemstra-Jones' test is that the test statistic ignores possible variations in the conditional distribution that may occur under the null hypothesis. As the size of the test approaches unity, the test statistic almost always rejects Granger noncausality, when in fact no such causality exists. The Diks and Panchenko's test offers a solution to the distortions of the actual size of the Hiemstra-Jones' test and was therefore preferred in our application despite the relatively short time series for some countries in the sample. breaks and/or nonlinearities. That said, although visual inspection of the plots of time series can provide valuable information about their evolution over time, determination of the actual order of integration of each time series is a task best left to unit root tests. The scatter plots of the relationship between Y and D presented in Fig. 2 are, for most countries, suggestive of a possible negative correlation between the variables though there is no clear cut pattern of such a relationship for some of the countries in question.
[ Fig. 1 and 2 here] Panel A of Table 1 presents the results of the Lee and Strazicich (2003) unit root test for the GDP growth rates series, which are found to be level stationary for all countries.
Panels B and C of Table 1 refer to the debt-to-GDP ratio, in levels and, where needed, in first and second differences. The results suggest that the debt-to-GDP ratio of Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK are level stationary, while that of Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Japan and the USA are first difference stationary. The results for the debt-to-GDP series of Belgium suggest that it is integrated of order two and thus, should this result be confirmed from nonlinear tests, this country would need to be excluded from the cointegration and causality analyses that follow.
[ Table 1 here] Table 2 reports the results of the W  linearity test statistic of Harvey et al. (2008) .
Regarding the growth series, the W  statistic rejects the null of linearity at the customary significance levels for Finland, France (7%), Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK. The test results further suggest that the debt-to-GDP series of Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal and Japan are also nonlinear.
[Tables 2 and 3 here]
Armed with the above findings, we perform nonlinear unit root tests for the variables that exhibit nonlinearities. Table 3 presents the results of the Kruse (2011) test applied to the raw, demeaned and detrended growth (Y) and debt (D) series. The findings suggest that the growth series of Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK are level stationary (Panel A). In addition, the debt-to-GDP ratio of Ireland is level stationary while that of Austria, France, Portugal and Japan would appear to be first difference stationary. For the debt-to-GDP ratios of France and Portugal, given the nonlinearity of the series, we follow the indication of the presence of a unit root detected by the Kruse (2011) test. The results for the debt-to-GDP ratio of Belgium confirm that this series is integrated of order two and thus this country is excluded from the analyses that follow. Aiming to establish the existence of a possible long-run relationship between growth and debt for these countries, we additionally employed OLS. The estimated parameters and diagnostics are presented in Table 4 , is -at best -likely to apply solely to the short-term.
[Tables 4 and 5 here]
For the remaining countries, i.e. Austria, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Japan, and the USA, we have established that their growth rates are level stationary and their debt-to-GDP ratios are, most likely, first difference stationary. Thus, in order to investigate the existence of a possible long-run relationship, we proceed by using the ARDL bounds testing approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1999; Pesaran et al., 2001) . Table 6 , presents the ARDL bounds test results, the estimated long-run coefficients (where applicable), and some diagnostics. From the FPSS and tBDM statistics, at the 1% and 5% significance levels, we find evidence in support of cointegration for Austria (in both directions), France (from debt to growth), Luxembourg (from debt to growth), the Netherlands (from debt to growth), Portugal
(from debt to growth), Japan (from growth to debt and debt to growth), and the USA (from debt to growth). For Austria, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Japan, the estimated longrun coefficients ( Y  and/or D  ) are statistically significant and negative. On the other hand, for the Netherlands and the USA the long-run coefficients are not significant, suggesting the absence of a long-run relationship between the variables, and hence any long-run path to causality. The diagnostics of the models that exhibit cointegration for Austria, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Japan (from growth to debt model only) are quite satisfactory.
However, for Japan (debt to growth model) the diagnostics reveal serial correlation. As shown in Fig. 3 , according to the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the CUSUM sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests to assess parameter constancy, all the models appear to be stable with the exception of the Netherlands (hence corroborating the finding of an insignificant long-run coefficient) and Japan (for the growth to debt model), which fail to pass the more powerful CUSUMSQ test.
Overall, and taking into account the inferences about the statistical significance of the long-run coefficients and the conclusions to be drawn from our battery of diagnostics tests, we detect evidence of robust, linear level relationships, and thus long-run causality, only for Austria, in both directions, and for France, Luxembourg and Portugal in the direction running from debt to growth.
[ Table 6 and Fig. 3 here] The results of the Diks and Panchenko (2006) nonlinear causality test are in Table 7 .
For Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK, where both growth and debt are I(0), we apply the test on the residuals of a VAR model in levels (see Table 7 , Panel A). For France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Japan and the USA, where the growth series are I(0) and the debt series are I(1), and a long-run level relation has been detected in one direction only, we apply the test on the residuals of a VAR model with the growth series in levels and the debt series in first differences (Table 7 , Panel B). For Austria, where ARDL cointegration has been detected in both directions, we apply the test on the residuals of the respective ARDL model (Table 7 , Panel C). The last two columns of Table 7 also presents the LjungBox Q-test (applied to the residuals from the VAR/ARDL models) in order to determine whether any linear dependency remains in the residuals. With the exception of Luxembourg (growth causes debt case), the results of this test suggest that the VAR/ARDL models successfully account for linear dependency.
[ Table 7 here]
According to the results presented in Table 7 , at the 1% and 5% levels, significant nonlinear causal effects are only detected for Finland (growth causes debt) only when two and three lags are considered, for Italy (growth causes debt) only when one lag is considered, and for Spain, from growth to debt and debt to growth, only when one and two lags are considered, respectively. Thus, with the exception of very sporadic and short-lived episodes, there is no evidence of a consistent and systematic pattern of nonlinear causality present in the relationship between public debt and economic growth across the countries in our sample.
In conclusion, we unveil evidence of (linear) bi-directional Granger causality only for Austria, with a much larger negative coefficient in the regression running from growth to debt (-20.62 and growth across the countries in our sample.
As highlighted in our literature review, previous studies present very mixed results.
These include the absence of any evidence that debt causes growth (as concluded by Panizza and Presbitero, 2014) , the presence of a higher number of statistically significant relationships running from growth to debt (see, e.g., Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro, 2015), and "clear evidence" of causality and that "it is always bi-directional" (Ferreira, 2009, p. 12) . Our results sit comfortably between this vastly conflicting range of prior findings, though they lean towards the rejection of the hypothesis of any causal relationship between the variables given that our battery of linear and nonlinear tests only uncover robust evidence of long-run causality in four out of the twelve countries examined (Austria, in both directions, and France, Luxembourg and Portugal from debt to growth). Di Sanzo and Bella (2015) find greater evidence in favor of causality than we do. However, lack of investigation of the cointegrating properties of the debt and growth series, and their failure to properly establish the linearity or otherwise of the individual series and to carry out nonlinear unit root tests to accurately identify the actual order of integration of the debt and growth series, raises doubts as to the reliability of their Diks and Panchenko (2006) nonlinear causality test results since, as they themselves acknowledge, the validity of the linear and nonlinear Granger causality tests they perform hinges on "the hypothesis that the observed data are stationary" (p. 640).
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Unlike Di Sanzo and Bella (2015) , as per our discussion in section 3.4, we ensured the proper application of the Diks and Panchenko (2006) test on stationary series by utilizing properly specified VAR models or, in the case of confirmed robust cointegration in both directions, the residuals of the ARDL models. For an analogous implementation of this test to ensure accurate results, see De Vita and Trachanas (2016).
Lack of a uniform result across all countries in our sample may be due to the fact that the effect of debt on growth depends either on its composition (Dell'Erba et al., 2013) or the specific production technologies in a given country (Temple, 1999) . Any divergence with previous work also lends itself to a straightforward rationalization. For example, whilst Ferreira's (2009) sample period is rather short (14 years) and dated (ending at 2001), we cover a time frame spanning from 1970 to 2014. Moreover, Ferreira (2009) used real GDP per capita to measure economic growth, and the values she obtains for the overall "Rsquared" and "R-squared between" measures of her panel estimations, reveal considerable differences in the behavior of the 20 OECD countries that make up the sample she used, which suggests that such countries constitute anything but a homogenous set.
Our results align more closely to those by Pescatori et al. (2014) who, using a novel empirical approach and an extensive dataset, conclude that "the relationship between debt and growth is relatively muted and the magnitude is much smaller than the dramatic figures suggested in earlier studies." (p. 15). However, by their own admission, while their methodology may attenuate problems of reverse causality, their analysis is still subject to potential endogeneity concerns.
Robustness tests
Our analysis would be incomplete without offering some reassurances as to the reliability of our time series test results. With this aim in mind, the first question we address is, how sensitive are our results to the methodologies employed? In particular, having established the behavior of the individual countries in our sample, especially in light of the relatively short time series particularly for some countries, we seek to verify the extent to which a reliable panel estimation method would generate results that broadly corroborate our time series findings. To this end, we employ a powerful panel methodology particularly suited to deal with econometric issues arising from estimation of the relationship at hand, namely SYS-GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) . In addition to accounting for the underlying dynamics and individual country-specific effects, 13 SYS-GMM corrects for potential problems stemming from the correlation between the regressors and the error term, measurement error and endogeneity. The SYS-GMM approach also allows for a panel data test of Granger causality. For instance, taking the regression 13 The first-difference transformation embedded in the standard GMM estimator, the first step of SYS-GMM, effectively eliminates the heterogeneity of individual country-specific effects included in the baseline equation. estimations based on annual data, we were unable to run separate regressions for shorter subperiods (too few observations post 2009), but we can now test this hypothesis using SYS-GMM, which is particularly well suited to address the potential 'small T' sample bias stemming from regressions with few time periods.
We then wish to establish how measure-dependent our results are by testing their sensitivity to alternative debt and growth measures. Since 'gross debt' data in particular may not be immune to measurement issues (Dippelsman et al., 2012) , we start by using the alternative gross government debt-to-GDP ratios downloaded from http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topis/9/, which are the data updates discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) , also used by Chudik et al. (2017) . Further, we reestimate using two alternative data series for growth. The first is 'real GDP per capita' from the Maddison database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm), also used by Lof and Malinen (2014). The second is a real GDP growth measure we computed ourselves by taking the real GDP series available from AMECO, the same database from which we sourced the original debt-to-GDP series.
Finally, given that the gains from SYS-GMM versus the traditional GMM estimator are more pronounced when the size of T (time periods) is small relative to N (country units),
we check for any possible small sample bias by expanding our cross-sectional units of the panel. The extended sample includes the EU-28 (while still excluding Germany) alongside other OECD countries, namely the US, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Mexico, Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
[ Tables 8 and 9 here] Tables 8 and 9 report the SYS-GMM estimations in the direction of growth to debt and debt to growth, respectively. In both tables, column (1) reports the estimations for the full sample , based on a balanced panel that draws from the same dataset as our time series estimations. Columns (2) and (3) refer to the sub-samples 1980-2006 and 2009-2014, respectively (to ensure an end date at 2014, the latter sub-sample is based on an unbalanced panel). Column (4) refers to estimations employing the real GDP growth measure we constructed with data sourced from AMECO, column (5) uses the alternative debt measure discussed above, and column (6) additionally uses the alternative growth data series from the Maddison database. Since the alternative measure of debt is drawn from a dataset whose coverage ends at 2010, the balanced panel in columns (5) and (6) refers to the period 1980-2010. Also, since this dataset does not provide information for Luxemburg, only eleven country units are used in estimation. Column (7) re-estimates the specification and measures used in column (1) but for a much larger sample of (37) countries, as detailed above.
As shown in Table 8 
Conclusions
Following the global financial crisis, an assumed yet substantially untested assumption concerning the relationship between public debt and economic growth has sat at the heart of justifications of national austerity responses within and beyond Europe. This paper interrogates this relationship, moving beyond the usual 'threshold analysis' to test for the bi-directional causality between debt and growth for 10 EMU countries along with the US,
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Although SYS-GMM deals with time invariant country-specific effects, it assumes the absence of crosssectional dependence, which can arise due to spatial effects or unobserved common factors. Hence, we also reestimated our baseline panel model of column 1 in Table (8) and (9), using the Dynamic Common Correlated Effects Estimator (DCCE) proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2015) ; a method that is robust to different types of cross-sectional dependence. In the DCCE specification, the first and second lag of growth rate (Y) and debt-to-GDP ratio (D) were instrumented by their fourth and fifth lag, with three lags used for the cross section averages. Also the results of these estimations (available on request) produced results consistent with statistically insignificant effects for both the growth to debt and the debt to growth regressions. UK and Japan, over the period 1970-2014, using state-of-the-art linear and nonlinear techniques. Our analysis addresses the still unsettled question of the effect of public debt accumulation on economic growth and whether some reverse causality may be at work, with low GDP growth causing increases in public indebtedness.
Our results indicate that the causal relationship between debt and growth, in either direction, is weak at best. In 8 out of the 12 countries in our sample (Belgium had to be excluded from the estimations due to the higher order of integration detected for the debt-to-GDP series), our data are unable to uncover robust evidence of long-run causality from either debt to growth or growth to debt. Only for Austria bi-directional causality is found (with a much stronger effect from growth to debt) while for France, Luxembourg and Portugal, causality runs solely in the direction of debt to growth, but with estimated long-run coefficients of very small magnitudes ranging from -0.01 for France, to -0.03 for Luxemburg and Portugal. Our results survive a wide range of robustness checks.
Our findings of effects varying according to country suggest that different policy recommendations would be called for depending on the country in question, whether any evidence of causality is in fact present and, if so, its direction and associated sign and magnitude of the long-run coefficient. The mixed findings at country level most likely reflect the possibility that the many positive and negative effects postulated theoretically with respect to the influence of debt on growth as well as hypotheses advanced in relation to the impact of growth on debt levels, assume relative significance and possibly cancel each other out depending on country-specific characteristics. The existence or otherwise of postulated effects may also be contingent on possible differences characterizing the structure and composition of the debt across countries (which one cannot control for when taking gross debt levels as aggregate quantities as a proportion of GDP), specific production technologies in each country, and the way in which different policy-driven regimes in different countries may themselves affect the response of one variable to changes in the other.
Our findings, therefore, cannot be taken as definitive ones and do not, by themselves, invalidate hypotheses postulating effects in either direction in the relationship between debt and growth. Not finding Granger causality in the data does not necessarily rule out the existence of an economic relation between the variables. Indeed, several caveats must be acknowledged when interpreting our results. First, unlike structural models, our Granger-type causality analysis focuses exclusively on a simple bivariate relationship and hence fails to account for the impact of other macroeconomic and institutional variables that can influence debt levels and economic growth and the causality patterns between them. Second, failure to reject the null hypothesis of 'no causality' at aggregate level does not mean that the two variables may not be related or that there may not be countries in which, at very high levels of debt (above 80% of GDP), such indebtedness does affect growth, as found in several studies that employ a structural nonlinear approach and specifically test for a threshold level effect (see, among others, Kumar and Woo, 2010; Baum et al., 2013) . After all, many countries in our sample have, over much of the period considered in our estimations, recorded levels of indebtedness below 80% of GDP, where the correlation with economic growth is supposedly constant according to nonlinear structural models which assume a threshold effect near 80%-100%. Notes: Model A allows for a change in the level of the series; Model C allows for changes in the level and slope of the trend of the series. The optimal lag structure is chosen following a general-to-specific approach, as suggested by Lee and Strazicich (2004) , starting with max 4 lags, and is displayed in parentheses. The critical values are from Lee and Strazicich (2003, p. 1084) . ***, ** and * denote rejection of the null of a unit root at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively.  distribution and the relevant critical values are 9.21 (1%), 5.99 (5%) and 4.60 (10%). ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null of linearity at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. Kruse (2011, p. 77) . The estimation and tests were conducted using the program code written in 'R' that was produced and provided by Kruse. ***, ** and * denote the rejection of the null of a unit root at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. denote rejection of the null hypothesis of 'no cointegration' at the 1 and 5% significance level, respectively. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Parameter C for the bandwidth is 8, the theoretical optimal rate β is 2/7, and the optimal bandwidth ε n is 1.5. The optimal VAR lag length has been chosen following the Schwarz information criterion, starting with max four lags. The estimation and tests were conducted using a program code written in C language provided by Cees Diks. LB(1) and LB(2) are the Ljung-Box statistics based on the VAR and ARDL residual series of the dependent variable up to the 1 st and 2 nd lag. v denotes cases in which the SIC suggested VAR structure ('constant only model') was overridden with a VAR(1) to allow estimation. p-values are reported in square brackets. ***, ** and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. D 1980-2013 1980-2006 2009-2014 1980-2013 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2014 1980-2013 1980-2006 2009-2014 1980-2013 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2014 
